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a b s t r a c t
I examine whether or not the incomes of the poor systematically grow with average incomes, and
whether financial development enhances the incomes of the poorest quintile. Following the methodology
of Dollar and Kraay (2002), I find, once extending Dollar and Kraay’s data, their findings are robust to the
Lucas critique and economic growth is important for poverty reduction universally. However, in compar-
ison to other authors’ work I show financial development aids the incomes of the poor in certain regions,
whilst it may be detrimental in others. This proposes evidence against a ‘‘one size fits all’’ model adding a
further contribution to the literature on financial development and poverty.
 2012 Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Since the turn of the millennium, and up until the financial cri-
sis, growth of the world economy has been relatively strong.
Growth with equity is a challenge that most governments have
tried to establish with sceptics suggesting both cannot be accom-
plished simultaneously. Dollar and Kraay (2002) in an influential
paper asked; ‘‘does the per capita income growth of the poor rise
proportionally, less than proportionally, or more than proportion-
ally to average per capita income growth?’’ their findings suggest
that this is the case, hence emphasise the importance of economic
growth for poverty reduction.
If growth is good for the poor, then growth enhancing policies
should be encouraged. Literature suggests that certain policies
and institutions exist that may further stimulate economic growth.
In their paper, Dollar and Kraay suggest that trade openness, gov-
ernment consumption, the inflation rate, the rule of law and finan-
cial development may influence economic growth. Furthermore, a
claim laid down is that these policies may even accrue or offset the
income growth of the poor.
This is not to suggest that further factors may influence the
economic growth process. Education is one tool that has been
attributed to growth amongst others.
A rough battery of empirical evidence supports Dollar and
Kraay’s suggestions, in which openness to trade has been found
to increase long run GDP per capita growth. Using the Sachs
Warner index as a measure of openness, Greenaway et al. (1998)
find that when this indicator variable takes the value of one
highlighting an open economy, growth may be increased by 46%.
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) report that government consumption
is harmful to growth; however, Dowrick (1996) shows that govern-
ment consumption may be growth enhancing if it is maintained
between a region of 10–18%. There is substantial evidence that
inflation is harmful to growth. Barro (1996a,b) finds that an in-
crease in inflation of ten percentage points retards growth by
0.2–0.3% hence over a thirty year period growth may be reduced
up to 7%. Examining past work on the role of strong property rights
and/or rule of law Knack and Keefer (1995) mention their impor-
tance for growth while Barro (1996a,b) empirically tests this
hypothesis finding a strong legal system is required for favourable
growth rates.
The literature on financial development and economic growth is
extremely rich where early theoretical suggestions such as those
by Schumpeter (1911) highlight the importance of finance for eco-
nomic growth. Critics have challenged this view, suggesting
finance merely follows growth, Robinson (1962). King and Levine
(1993) in their interestingly titled paper ‘‘Schumpeter might be
right’’ test these theories empirically and find that finance may
cause economic growth. Moreover, the paper’s results have since
been complemented by further studies, including time series ap-
proaches and those of panel data from authors such as Arestis
and Demetriades (1997), Luintel and Khan (1999), Levine et al.
(2000) and Levine (2003).
Recently, Rousseau andWachtel (2005) examine whether or not
the finance-growth nexus has become extinct. The authors take the
King and Levine (1993) data and thoroughly examine the robust-
ness of this relationship finding that the results fail to carry over
when more data is added to the research question. On closer
inspection they find, when splitting the sample into 5 year periods,
the 1970s and early 1980s were the main drivers of the
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relationship, hence from 1990 onwards the data was susceptible to
the Lucas critique.
If financial development is no longer growth enhancing as the
results from Rousseau and Watchel seem to suggest, a question
emerges; does financial development still benefit the poor?
If finance is available to the poor, then it may provide the poor
with a means to save. In less developed countries (LDCs) cases exist
where money is stored under a mattress, which may be problem-
atic and hamper a households ability to move up the social ladder.
First, this money is vulnerable to theft, and keeping track of where
all the money is hidden within a household is challenging. Second,
during periods of macroeconomic instability, which may include
periods of hyperinflation, savings accounts which are indexed to
inflation may prevent this money from eroding away in value, a
benefit for the poor. With a lack of savings accounts the poor
may waste accumulated assets on the purchase of unnecessary
physical capital, for example oxen for farming. These physical as-
sets do not improve productivity or offer any major returns to
the poor; they are just purchased for their ease of monitoring/stor-
age and are highly illiquid when acquired. Moreover the presence
of savings accounts may prevent transitory poverty by providing
opportunities to utilise savings and consumption smooth during
difficult times.
Furthermore, savings accounts in financial institutions may
help the poor as accumulated savings over a generation may allow
a family’s offspring to pay for, and attain higher levels of formal
education if parents are altruistic. This allows inter-generational
mobility through the classes to be established more easily.
If we assume a fixed cost to be an entrepreneur, with perfect
financial markets, a poor entrepreneur could go to a bank, highlight
his business plan, and the ability of financial institutions to moni-
tor and recognise good investments may allow poor entrepreneurs
(those with the greatest entrepreneurial ability and the most tal-
ent) to have society’s funds directed to them, as opposed to those
with average ideas and existing wealth/established connections/
collateral to take out a loan. This provides the necessary opportu-
nities for the poor to move up the social ladder.
Research on finance and poverty alleviation is more recent and
in its infancy compared to studies on finance and aggregate
growth. Claessens and Perotti (2007) provide a summary of the
existing literature, where Beck et al. (2007) discover fascinating
empirical results.
Beck et al. (2007) complement the study of Dollar and Kraay
(2002) with a stricter focus on the impact of financial development
on poverty, specifically examining the Gini coefficient, the income
share of the poor, and the percentage of people living on less than
$1 a day.1 Their conclusions indicate that financial development is
poverty reducing. Furthermore, they find that 40% of income growth
from the poorest quintile is a result of reductions in inequality, but
60% due to the impact of financial development on aggregate
growth. Hence, not only is financial development in their study pos-
itively associated with income growth of the poor, but their results
suggest, that financial sector reforms, which reduce market frictions
may also lower inequality, without the incentive problems which
redistribution schemes that include generous social security pay-
ments create.
Hence I do not just focus on finance and its effects on poverty,
but I consider whether or not aggregate growth has an impact on
the poor in tandem. The motivation of this study is to examine first
whether, unlike the results found by Rousseau and Watchel on the
finance-growth nexus, do Dollar and Kraay’s (2002) findings
remain with the inclusion of more data.
Second, I complement the Beck et al. (2007) study by using
additional measures of financial development such as those used
by King and Levine (1993) which were found to break down by
Rousseau and Wachtel (2005) when modern data was included.
Moreover, I choose to include a market based measure of financial
development in the hope to prove that for poverty reduction it is
just the overall level of financial development that matters, regard-
less of whether the development comes from the bank side or the
market side. In addition, I choose to strictly follow the Dollar and
Kraay methodology in the hope that the relationship between fi-
nance and poverty proposed by Beck et al. (2007) withstands fur-
ther scrutiny.
This study, when including further data covers over one hun-
dred countries and spans over fifty years. I expect to find that
growth is good for the poor, and my results are at least as signifi-
cant as those provided by Dollar and Kraay (2002). Furthermore, I
aim to add to the Beck et al. (2007) study and show that financial
development is imperative to the income growth of the poor, irrel-
evant of the financial development indicator used.2
2. Data and methodology
The original data is from Dollar and Kraay (2002), available to
download from The World Bank.3 The extended dataset comes from
World Bank databases with information and definitions found in
Table A of the appendix.
The dependent variable income growth of the poor is measured
as the GDP per capita growth of the income of the lowest quintile.4
This measure is used as it is consistent with the study of Dollar and
Kraay, which I am trying to extend and check who’s initial results
hold, but also because it is a variable that is abundant.5
Financial development in this instance is measured as the depth
of the financial system. Ideally, further measures that show the
outreach of the financial system (breadth) would be useful, for
example data showing the amount of access the finance system
provides, but sadly due to data scarcity this cannot be accom-
plished. Private Credit as a ratio of GDP is one of the most fre-
quently used measures of financial development and measures
the channelling of savers’ funds to private projects, one main func-
tion of financial intermediaries. This variable was used by Beck
et al. (2007) in their own particular extension of Dollar and Kraay.
Further measures of financial development are also well used in
the literature. King and Levine (1993) use Liquid Liabilities as a ra-
tio of GDP.6 This variable was found to be significant in the study of
King and Levine (1993) on aggregate growth but became insignifi-
cant in the Rousseau and Wachtel (2005) paper when they extended
the former authors’ data. Hence I choose to include this measure of
financial development due to the interesting experiences this vari-
able has shown in the literature.
I incorporate a market measure of financial development. The
chosen variable is Stock Market Capitalisation. Empirical results
suggest that stock markets may increase growth, Levine and Zervos
(1998), with further conclusions from the authors highlighting that
banks provide different services than those provided by stock mar-
1 Recent updates state the new poverty line is $1.25 a day as suggested by Ravallion
et al. (2008) ‘‘Dollar a day revisited.’’
2 Financial development is defined in the next section, as are the ways it is
measured.
3 www.worldbank.org/research/growth.
4 For the new waves of data I use and agglomerate the UN-WIDER Inequality
Database http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database to calculate the new income
shares.
5 As there is limited data on further measures of the poor such as the headcount
ratio it may not be worthwhile examining these variables as observations would be
extremely low.
6 Liquid liabilities is measured as M3 as a ratio of GDP and is also known as broad
money. It measures the overall size of the banking system. Hence it shows the extent
of the formal financial intermediary sector relative to economic activity.
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kets stressing their importance. Moreover, research suggests that
countries with better developed stock markets also have better
developed banks. In entrepreneurial projects where disagreement
exists about investing in a venture, a well financed minority of
investors may still be able to finance the project through the pur-
chase of shares, where a bank may be reluctant to invest without a
clear majority in agreement of funding the enterprise. This may be
important for poor entrepreneurs, who may only be able to con-
vince a minority of investors of their project. Other research states
that the overall development of the financial sector is important
regardless if the development is from banks or markets, further-
more highlighting the inclusion of this variable.
Ideally, a measure for the stock market such as the Turnover Ra-
tio, or even Value Traded, would have been appropriate to use in
the study as this shows the liquidity of the stock market. One
important factor of trading in the stock market is that for a saver,
a saver’s stocks may be transferred into cash quickly; however,
as data is limited, the measure Stock Market Capitalisation as a ra-
tio of GDP is used.7
The control variables selected in the study are those used by
Dollar and Kraay (2002) and are selected here to make sure that,
when their results are checked for the Lucas critique, everything
remains consistent. Beck et al. (2007) favoured a different ap-
proach where they replaced the rule of law variable with the aver-
age years of school attainment to control for human capital and as
opposed to controlling for GDP per capita growth at the mean level
as Dollar and Kraay (2002) and I do, they control for GDP per capita
growth using growth of the lowest income share.8
I measure the income of the poor as the income share of the
lowest quintile. When updating the sample, if data from the same
named source exists and is updated for country (i), I use that
source irrelevant of quality ratings. If the data from the same
named source does not exist for future waves, I select the observa-
tion based on two certain criteria: I try and choose the observa-
tions with the highest quality ratings while simultaneously
trying to select the data sources that are most frequently used in
the already existing dataset from Dollar and Kraay (2002).
The new data for the remaining variables was selected follow-
ing the Dollar and Kraay (2002) procedure, where I select the last
observation for a particular cross section (i) used by Dollar and Kra-
ay, and then move forward a minimum of 5 years, selecting data
for the next decade until time expires for that particular cross sec-
tion. In some cases a particular cross section permitted the inclu-
sion of more than one additional time period (t), as revisions in
data meant that some data in the penultimate decade were now
available. Hence, at times, two or three waves were added to cer-
tain cross sections, but this was a rarity.9
Table1 showshowthenumberof observationsand cross sections
increasewhen I add further data while examining the financial vari-
ables.10The far largernumberof observations and cross sections inmy
study provides greater worldwide representation in my estimations
and increased flexibility for the number of instruments used when
using a System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator.
Furthermore, theDollar andKraaydata spans across fourdecadeswith
observations from 1956 to 1999. The additional wave(s) include
observations until 2008, thus further modernising this study.
An important observation is thatwhenBeck et al. (2007) run their
system estimator using Private Credit, they have 245 observations
whilst I have close to 300 when a full set of controls are imposed,
hence I have a richer dataset. The data also spans into a time when
the world economy suffered a shock with the global financial crisis.
Despite not beingmy primary research question, it may be interest-
ing to see whether or not the crisis did have any effects on the in-
come growth of the poor in comparison to Beck et al. (2007).
Initially, I carry out cross country regressions where I regress
the per capita income of the poor on the natural logarithm of aver-
age per capita income. Unlike other methods, which use one obser-
vation per cross section, I use all available data in order to preserve
degrees of freedom, hence run pooled cross country regressions.11
Eq. (1) is initially estimated using ordinary least squares and
then using instrumental variables. Instrumenting for mean income
is carried out by using growth in mean income prior to time (t).
Ypi;t ¼ aþ bY i;t þ li þ i;t ð1Þ
Ypi;t  Y
p
i;tk ¼ bðY i;t  Y i;tkÞ þ ði;t  i;tkÞ ð2Þ
It would be quite common to find unobserved country specific ef-
fects (li) to exist such as those in Eq. (1), hence I regress Eq. (1)
in differences, Eq. (2). I expect individual country effects to have
some influence on the results, where certain countries located in
advantaged regions and abundant with resources may have a posi-
tive effect on the income growth of the poor, but to what extent I
cannot be sure. Nevertheless differencing sweeps away these indi-
vidual effects.12 I then estimate Eq. (2) using ordinary least squares
and then an instrumental variable approach. When applying the
instrumental variable estimator to Eq. (2), a further instrument is
used, the level of mean income at the beginning of the period.
Despite removing the unobserved country specific effects by
estimating the equation in differences (2), it would be more ideal
to exploit the wider cross country variation as opposed to the time
series variation as Eq. (2) does. As a result I use a panel estimator
and the favoured estimator is System GMM proposed by Blundell
and Bond (1998). If we assume that the coefficients of (1) and (2)
are the same, we may regress our relation as a system. The pro-
posed estimator not only manages to fully control for country-
specific effects, but also may deal with endogeneity concerns.
Ypi;t ¼ aþ bY i;t þ c
0Xi;t þ li þ i;t ð3Þ
Ypi;t  Y
p
i;tk ¼ bðY i;t  Y i;tkÞ þ c
0ðX i;t  Xi;tkÞ þ ði;t  i;tkÞ ð4Þ
Eqs. (3) and (4) introduce additional variables into the specification
in the (X) matrix. Some of the control variables may be endogenous.
Dollar and Kraay claim endogeneity concerns may exist for financial
development and inflation, but not openness to trade.13,14 As I
Table 1
Comparisons between the two samples.
Dollar and Kraay (2002) Updated sample
Obs. Cross sections Obs. Cross sections
Basic specification 269 85 414 115
Commercial bank 232 76 367 108
Private credit 221 74 362 109
Liquid liabilities 204 65 332 103
Stock market 53 30 143 69
7 For the Dollar and Kraay sample using Stock Market Capitalisation led to a sample
of only 53 observations, with Value Traded this figure was far smaller.
8 When the correlations were examined prior to running the regressions, it was
found that including both rule of law and schooling would cause multicollinearity
problems, and as I was following Dollar and Kraay (2002) more specifically than Beck
et al. (2007), I chose the former.
9 The reasoning for using this methodology is to prevent the sample to be over-
dominated by those countries whose income distribution data is more frequent and
abundant.
10 Full descriptive statistics of the variables may be found in the appendix, Table B.
11 See Beck et al. (2007) for detailed information on this technique.
12 Note that here the aand the literm get differenced away.
13 Beck et al. (2007) treat financial development as endogenous and instrument it
using absolute latitude of a nation’s capital indexed between 0 and 1, and by legal
origin.
14 Dollar and Kraay (2002) fail to mention about the rule of law but one would
expect that this variable may be endogenous.
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strictly follow Dollar and Kraay (2002), I instrument for income only,
as my results, as those found in Dollar and Kraay (2002), show the
tests of overidentifying restrictions pass even when instrumenting
for income only. This provides indirect evidence that the Xvariables
are uncorrelated with the error terms. Second, if I was to instrument
for all possible endogenous variables using appropriate lags, then
GMM may become inconsistent.15
The GMM estimator controls for endogeneity using internal
instruments where it uses specified lagged variables in level terms
as instruments for the regression in differences, and in the level
equation, chosen lagged differences are used as instruments.
The chosen estimator requires that there exist more instru-
ments than endogenous regressors, hence the equation is over
identified.16 Two specification tests exist to check the validity of
the instruments, the Hansen J-test or the Sargan test. A second
assumption is required when using this estimator that no second or-
der serial correlation exists; however, the estimation procedure re-
quires the presence of first order serial correlation. If these two
main assumptions are not violated, hence both null hypotheses are
not rejected from the specification tests, then the coefficient esti-
mates are efficient.
In all the regressions, I run a hypothesis test to see if growth is
good for the poor. This follows suit to Dollar and Kraay, where I test
whether the coefficient on average per capita income is 1. If the
coefficient on (b) is not significantly different from 1 then the in-
comes of the poorest quintile grow systematically with average in-
comes- a result that I wish to hold for all the estimations.
3. Results
Table 2 shows the replicated results of Dollar and Kraay using
Stata where Table 3 shows the results when the data is updated.
In all specifications it is seen that average growth is positive and
significant with a coefficient close to 1. Table 2 suggests that the
null hypothesis of income growth of the poor being proportional
to mean income growth, is only rejected in column one. However
this rejection seems to be a positive rejection where a 1% increase
in mean income growth would increase growth of the poorest
quintile by more than 1%.
When the data is extended, the results appear to be stronger.
For the benchmark case, it may be stated that growth is good for
the poor, and that the original results from Dollar and Kraay
(2002) are robust to the Lucas critique. With the additional data,
the specification test that (b = 1) is rejected on three occasions, in
columns one, two and five of Table 3. Moreover, in all three in-
stances, the nature of the rejection posits that income growth of
the lowest quintile grows more than proportionally to average
per capita income growth.
One variant of the specification is to test whether the slope of
average growth on the system estimator varies by region. The
Dollar & Kraay results show that for most regions, the overall effect
of the coefficients is approximately one; however, the coefficient
for the omitted category, the developed countries, shows an elas-
ticity of 1.35%.
The elasticity of the poors’ incomes with respect to average in-
comes in Latin America is 0.34, which is very low, and Dollar and
Kraay (2002) state this result is attributed to the unusually poor
performance of instruments in the sample.
When the sample is extended, the results differ by a large de-
gree. Here with the addition of a decade’s worth of data, the
growth coefficient for the control group shrinks to over half its size,
and the slope coefficients for the regions switch signs.17 Moreover,
the overall effects exhibit interesting results, as in the new sample
all the coefficients with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa are very
close to unity, and are all significant. If we compare that to the con-
trol group, it is shown, that if growth rates for all countries were
equal, a catching up effect in terms of income growth would take
place for the poor in those regions relative to the control groups
poor.
It may be plausible to suggest that the results seen in Table 4
have occurred due to the intensity of mean economic growth as
a determinant on the income growth of the lowest quintile. Over
the period from 2000–2009, when the sample has been updated,
with the exception of the financial crisis, most regions have had
growth rates that have outperformed those of the control group.
It may be for that very reason that the results exhibit a catching
up effect for the income growth of the poor relative to the control
group.
This highlights an important consideration, as it may be the
case that when examining financial development, the effects may
differ between the control group, sub-Saharan Africa, and all
remaining regions just as they do with the growth regressions in
Table 4.
Beck et al. (2007) tested the relationship between financial
development and the level of economic development, finding that
this interaction was insignificant, hence income growth of the poor
Table 2
Simple growth regressions.
Income
quintile 1
Income
quintile 1
Differenced
income
quintile 1
Differenced
income
quintile 1
System
OLS IV OLS IV GMM
Intercept 1.762⁄⁄⁄ 2.720⁄⁄ 1.259⁄⁄⁄
(0.211) (1.257) (0.501)
GDP 1.072⁄⁄⁄ 1.187⁄⁄⁄ 0.983⁄⁄⁄ 0.904⁄⁄⁄ 1.012⁄⁄⁄
(0.024) (0.151) (0.079) (0.119) (0.060)
P-Ho b = 1 0.003 0.215 0.834 0.421 0.836
P-OID 0.177 0.235
T-NOSC 0.800
Obs. 269 269 269 269 269
Dependent variable = ln Per Capita Income Growth of the Poor.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
⁄ Indicate 10% significance.
⁄⁄ Indicate 5% significance.
⁄⁄⁄ Indicate 1% significance.
15 When instrumenting for these variables in the final regressions, the instrument
count becomes almost double to the number of cross sections and GMM becomes
inconsistent, as the number of instruments becomes too large.
16 It is also stated that the number of instruments used should be far less than the
number of cross sectional units. 17 The control group is Western Europe, USA and Canada.
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did not vary with the level of GDP per capita. I on the other hand,
posit that regions may act differently to financial development and
apply the idea that locality and space may be more influential than
varying levels of GDP per capita alone.
The inclusion of control variables to vary the specification yield
results similar to Dollar and Kraay (2002). Included are trade open-
ness, government consumption, the presence of inflation, and the
rule of law quality. These variables are included one at a time
following the authors’ methodology, and the results in Table 5
show all the coefficients are correctly signed, with similar magni-
tudes as in the Dollar and Kraay paper.
In all regressions, average GDP per capita remains positive sig-
nificant and yields a coefficient close to one indicating that the
relationship between mean income growth and that of the income
growth of the poor is robust. Moreover, both the tests for overiden-
tifying restrictions and no presence of second serial correlation are
passed with their respective p-values in the non rejection zone of
the null hypotheses.
I show the effects of finance on the poor in Table 6. Here
columns 1–4 present the results for the original sample size and
columns 5–8 for the extended period. The variable Commercial
Bank Assets as a ratio of Total Bank Assets is successfully replicated
in column one using the Dollar and Kraay data. This variable is po-
sitive and insignificant, which is also the case when the sample is
extended. The addition of Private Credit in column 2 yields a coef-
ficient which is also positive and insignificant, one main difference
to the results found by Beck et al. (2007). In their study, the authors
found Private Credit to be a significant determinant to the income
growth of the poor, and the same applied for their other measures
of poverty. In the extended sample which covers the Beck et al.
(2007) time period Private Credit enters insignificantly. This seems
to suggest that the relationship between financial development
and poverty alleviation is sensitive to the specification chosen to
examine poverty.
When examining further measures of financial development,
Liquid Liabilities enters positively and significantly. This reflects
the overall size of the banking sector in relation to economic activ-
ity. Here in both sample periods the results are significant and the
coefficient is greater when the larger data set is used; however,
both coefficients are in line with previous estimates of the litera-
ture with coefficients of approximately 2%. The variable Stock Mar-
ket Capitalisation is negative and significant in column 4,
indicating finance is detrimental to income growth of the poor,
but becomes insignificant when the sample is lengthened.18
The results indicate that past findings from the finance and pov-
erty literature are susceptible to the specifications and control
variables used, but also to the measure of financial development.
Here, Private Credit, which shows the financial resources provided
as credit to the private sector, is insignificant. Yet, when Liquid Lia-
bilities is used as a financial development indicator, the results are
significant. It may be that what the poor really require are deposit
accounts, or methods to save money which Liquid Liabilities may
pick up more effectively than Private Credit. Hence, the results sug-
gest that opportunities to save may matter more for the poor, as
opposed to borrowing opportunities to expand businesses or be-
come entrepreneurs.
Once more all the specification tests are passed, and examining
the coefficient on mean growth, it keeps its strong significance and
the hypothesis of (b = 1) is never rejected.
Table 7 takes the results from Table 6 further interacting the
financial development variable with worldwide regions. Beck
et al. (2007) mention how over their sample period the population
living on less than $1 a day in Thailand fell dramatically, but how
the rate doubled in Venezuela, and how certain countries located
Table 3
Simple growth regressions – updated sample.
Income
quintile 1
Income
quintile 1
Differenced
income
quintile 1
Differenced
income
quintile 1
System
OLS IV OLS IV GMM
Intercept 1.567⁄⁄⁄ 4.029⁄⁄⁄ 1.494⁄⁄⁄
(0.124) (1.322) (0.182)
GDP 1.044⁄⁄⁄ 1.345⁄⁄⁄ 0.980⁄⁄⁄ 1.065⁄⁄⁄ 1.040⁄⁄⁄
(0.145) (0.161) (0.049) (0.100) (0.023)
P-Ho b = 1 0.003 0.033 0.690 0.517 0.080
P-OID 0.141 0.579
T-NOSC 0.630
Obs. 414 414 414 414 414
Notes: As Table 2.
Table 4
Growth rates varying by region.
Dollar and Kraay Updated sample
Intercept 4.308⁄⁄⁄ 2.437
(1.421) (1.737)
GDP 1.355⁄⁄⁄ 0.641⁄⁄⁄
(0.153) (0.182)
GDP⁄EAP 0.413⁄⁄ 0.327⁄
(0.173) (0.182)
GDP⁄ECA 0.290 0.386⁄⁄
(0.474) (0.188)
GDP⁄LAC 1.019⁄⁄⁄ 0.449⁄⁄
(0.368) (0.193)
GDP⁄MENA 0.243 0.399⁄⁄
(0.285) (0.183)
GDP⁄SA 0.239 0.390⁄⁄
(0.188) (0.186)
GDP⁄SSA 0.230 0.233
(0.256) (0.202)
P-Ho b = 1 0.020 0.049
[1ex] P-OID 0.133 0.461
T-NOSC 1.571 1.09
Obs. 269 414
Dependent variable = ln Per Capita Income Growth of the Poor.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Notes: Regional Dummies are included in the regression.
⁄ Indicate 10% significance.
⁄⁄ Indicate 5% significance.
⁄⁄⁄ Indicate 1% significance.
18 This particular results is very sceptical due to the small sample size.
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in certain regions experienced large increases in their Gini coeffi-
cients whilst others noticed a fall. Moreover, I choose to examine
regional variation as I am motivated by ideas of spatial economics,
where contiguity of countries that share borders may be
categorised more closely than by mere economic development.
The results in Table 7 show that, depending on which region of
the world a country is situated, it has a severe impact whether
financial development is good for the income growth of the poor.
More importantly, three of the financial development indicators
all now enter positively and significantly providing evidence that
a ‘‘one size fits all’’ model may not be the case when examining
finance and the poor, an additional contribution to the existing
literature.19
Foremost all the banking sector measures of financial develop-
ment enter positively and significantly for the control group.20 The
market based measure Stock Market Capitalisation is the only
financial variable that is insignificant.
Examining the interactions between financial development and
the regions, the first bank based measure Commercial Bank Assets
has significant interactions for the Latin America & Caribbean re-
gion and the Sub-Saharan African region. When testing for the lin-
ear combinations this financial measure then returns a positive
and significant coefficient for Eastern Europe & Central Asia, and
for South Asia.
Examining additional measures of finance, Private Credit
returns a regression with all the interactions significant. When
testing for their linear combinations, Eastern Europe & Central
Asia, and South Asia suggest that an increase in Private Credit in
these regions, may increase growth of income of the poorest quin-
tile. The Latin American region and Sub-Saharan African region
suggest that finance may be negatively associated with incomes
of the poorest quintiles, where an increase in Private Credit will
lead to reductions in income growth of the poor in those areas.
Liquid Liabilities has significant regional interactions for all
areas except for the Middle East & North African zone. When test-
ing for the linear combinations, all the regions maintain their
significance with one exception, the area of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Column 4 containing the financial development variable Stock
Market Capitalisation shows that finance is insignificant in the
Table 5
Additional control variables.
Openness G’ment cons Inflation Rule of law Openness G’ment cons Inflation Rule of law
Intercept 0.858 1.065⁄ 0.963 0.642 0.969⁄⁄⁄ 0.802⁄⁄⁄ 0.782⁄⁄⁄ 0.445
(0.705) (0.580) (0.594) (0.602) (0.344) (0.280) (0.282) (0.365)
GDP 0.993⁄⁄⁄ 1.019⁄⁄⁄ 1.002⁄⁄⁄ 0.950⁄⁄⁄ 0.998⁄⁄⁄ 0.990⁄⁄⁄ 0.979⁄⁄⁄ 0.931⁄⁄⁄
(0.078) (0.065) (0.063) (0.070) (0.037) (0.032) (0.030) (0.043)
Openness 0.039 0.016
(0.150) (0.058)
G’ment cons 0.568 0.503
(0.461) (0.408)
Inflation 0.135 0.074
(0.154) (0.055)
Rule of law 0.082 0.071
(0.062) (0.046)
P-Ho b = 1 0.850 0.772 0.975 0.481 0.961 0.745 0.481 0.111
P-OID 0.870 0.869 0.585 0.486 0.796 0.712 0.757 0.677
T-NOSC 0.55 0.40 0.22 0.76 1.18 1.09 0.97 0.02
Obs. 223 237 253 268 359 374 413 362
Notes: As Table 4.
Table 6
Analysing financial development.
Commercial bank Private credit Liquid liabilities Stock market Commercial bank Private credit Liquid liabilities Stock market
Intercept 0.964 1.072 0.799 0.381 1.112⁄⁄ 1.124⁄ 0.985⁄⁄ 2.330⁄⁄
(0.675) (1.429) (0.945) (1.519) (0.543) (0.591) (0.473) (1.092)
GDP 0.997⁄⁄⁄ 1.031⁄⁄⁄ 0.955⁄⁄⁄ 0.923⁄⁄⁄ 0.940⁄⁄⁄ 1.016⁄⁄⁄ 0.949⁄⁄⁄ 1.099⁄⁄⁄
(0.088) (0.191) (0.141) (0.301) (0.061) (0.069) (0.062) (0.084)
Commercial bank 0.036 0.134
(0.212) (0.280)
Private credit 0.089 0.214
(0.146) (0.184)
Liquid liabilities 0.018⁄ 0.023⁄⁄
(0.011) (0.010)
Stock market 0.266⁄⁄ 0.156
(0.103) (0.095)
P-Ho b = 1 0.970 0.871 0.752 0.797 0.322 0.821 0.414 0.235
P-OID 0.832 0.324 0.544 0.416 0.309 0.756 0.650 0.111
T-NOSC 0.55 0.46 0.14 0.10 0.26 0.68 0.78 1.06
Obs. 219 205 189 53 301 292 266 110
Notes: As Table 4.
19 It must be noted that these coefficients represent the values for the control group.
20 Commercial Bank Assets, Private Credit and Liquid Liabilities are the bank based
measures of financial development used in the paper.
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control region, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, and in the Middle
East & North Africa. When the linear combinations are tested, a
further region, East Asia & the Pacific, loses its significance. The
remaining significant regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America & the Caribbean suggest finance is detrimental on income
growth of the poor. The only remaining positive and significant re-
gion is South Asia where an increase in Stock Market Capitalisation
may result in an increase in income growth of the poor.
The results show wide variation in the effects of financial devel-
opment on the income growth of the poor between regions. The
interesting question is why is this the case? It may be seen that,
in general, finance has been extremely good for the income growth
of the poor in South Asia and the Control group, while this is the
contrary in Latin America. There is weak evidence from the results
suggesting that finance is also harmful in Sub-Saharan Africa,
whilst beneficial in Eastern Europe & Central Asia.
There are several possible hypotheses that may explain why
finance has been fruitful in some regions and not others.
First, it may be that despite a deep financial sector, access is not
universal. In India between 1977–1990, the Indian Social Banking
Experiment took place where rural poverty fell dramatically, Bur-
gess and Pande (2005). Here policy stated that a commercial bank
could only open a branch in a location with existing bank branches,
if it opened branches in four locations with no bank branches. The
benefits to the poor were great; hence, in terms of policy, it may be
that governments should focus on providing opportunities to ex-
pand financial access as opposed to purely focusing on depth. This
should result in only those who voluntarily exclude themselves to
be absent from the financial sector.
In the control region political pressures normally result in wide
access and allow the poor to access finance; however, in regions
such as South Asia where finance has been fruitful, past govern-
ment policy broadening access may be the reason why the poor
benefit from finance unlike in other regions such as Latin America
& the Caribbean.
Second financial illiteracy of the population coupled with
exploitive predatory behaviour of lenders may drive the results
from Table 7. The poor may only require simple transaction
accounts to take part in a market economy, but, being financially
illiterate they may be provided with or ask for checking accounts,
where severe overdraft charges may be incurred when the timing
of payments goes wrong. It may also be a case where the naive
poor are taken advantage of by predatory lenders who do not in-
form the borrower of all the conditions of the loan, crippling the
poor with spiralling charges, where the poor may have been better
off not participating in the financial sector. Educational advice such
as teaching sound money management and legal systems that
strictly enforce caveat emptor may prevent these adverse effects
from occurring, as would stringent regulatory policy designed to
make sure financial intermediaries do not abuse their position of
power regarding their services.
Financial liberalisation is associated with increased competi-
tion, privatisation and foreign ownership, which may expand
financial access for the poor once it becomes unprofitable to lend
to existing wealthy clientele, Gormley (2004) and Mian (2006). In
certain worldwide locations it may have taken longer for profit
to dry up when serving existing clients, hence a disparity exists
for why finance is beneficial in some regions as opposed to
others.21 However, Ang (2010) found liberalisation in India specifi-
cally led to a worsening of the income inequality problem, where
as the region of South Asia in this study, which composes of India,
showed great gains from financial development. Hence there may
be an argument that forced liberalisations or hasty liberalisation
Table 7
Analysing finance and regional interactions.
Commercial bank Private credit Liquid liabilities Stock market
GDP 0.937⁄⁄⁄ 1.008⁄⁄⁄ 1.026⁄⁄⁄ 0.935⁄⁄⁄
(0.056) (0.066) (0.106) (0.080)
Commercial bank 0.538⁄⁄
(0.262)
Private credit 0.354⁄
(0.194)
Liquid liabilities 0.244⁄⁄
(0.096)
Stock market 0.011
(0.074)
Fin⁄EAP 0.144 0.232⁄ 0.219⁄⁄ 0.242⁄⁄
(0.124) (0.134) (0.092) (0.112)
Fin⁄ECA 0.077 0.686⁄⁄⁄ 0.523⁄⁄⁄ 0.076
(0.120) (0.237) (0.201) (0.322)
Fin⁄LAC 0.754⁄⁄⁄ 1.540⁄⁄⁄ 1.426⁄⁄⁄ 0.957⁄⁄⁄
(0.112) (0.240) (0.326) (0.328)
Fin⁄MENA 0.142 0.163⁄⁄ 0.155 0.245
(0.169) (0.083) (0.130) (0.232)
Fin⁄SA 0.105 0.929⁄⁄ 0.516⁄ 1.248⁄
(0.169) (0.364) (0.279) (0.668)
Fin⁄SSA 0.474 ⁄⁄ 1.039⁄⁄⁄ 0.808⁄⁄ 0.255⁄⁄
(0.200) (0.345) (0.407) (0.117)
P-Ho b = 1 0.929 0.879 0.924 0.026
P-OID 0.564 0.891 0.806 0.426
T-NOSC 0.16 0.66 0.70 0.78
Obs. 301 292 266 110
Notes: As Table 4.
Intercept and control variables also included in the regression.
21 This may be attributable to the Bel-India problem.
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may be detrimental to the income growth of the poor, many of
which were common in Latin America during the sample period.
The results presented here on financial development indicate a
‘‘one size fits all’’ model may not be accurate of the world. These re-
sults may carry over for financial liberalisation, hence policy advice
would be to plan country specific liberalisations and not base any
plans on experiences of countries that have previously liberalised
their financial systems. Moreover, the issue of financial instability
may be playing a role where Akhter and Daly (2009) found in their
study that if financial instability accompanies financial development,
then this instability is detrimental to the well being of the poor. It
may be that some regions faced this financial instability when devel-
oping their financial systems as opposed to others which may be an
additional factor driving these results. These hypotheses, however,
should perhaps be researched more in their own right.
Differences in the efficiency of the financial institutions may
partially explain the results from Table 7. In regions where finance
has benefited the poor it may be that loans were targeted at good
enterprises that have grown, increased formal sector jobs (which in
turn can provide poor individuals documentation to open their
own financial accounts – a barrier in many LDCs), increased wages,
hence benefited the poor. This may be as opposed to in Latin
America & the Caribbean where lending has occurred to badly
targeted SMEs who have not grown as expected, hence limiting
the opportunities of the poor and not providing any income growth
prospects for the lowest quintile. This leads us to financial policy
advice suggesting that banks should perhaps implement greater
screening of clients’ business proposals prior to lending.22
Finally, country specific effects of big-players within regions
may influence the results. If theories of spatial economics are cor-
rect, it may be the case that neighbouring nations may adopt sim-
ilar practices to the big-players, and as a result, individual specific
effects from a country may have transmitted into the regions. This
certainly may explain why Latin America may have a negative
coefficient attributed to it, whilst South Asia has a positive coeffi-
cient. In Latin America, Brazil is the largest national economy,
and where financial development has increased over time, poverty
and inequality have remained relatively high despite their notable
decreases. On the other hand India, the so called big-player in
South Asia, has experienced a huge decline in inequality and pov-
erty with a fairly stable growth in financial development. These
questions I leave unexamined for future research.
Table A
Variable information.
Variable name Definition Source
Income of the poor Measured as the share of income of the lowest quintile. Calculated
by taking the share of income of the poorest fifth and then
multiplying by GDP, and then taking the logarithm of this value
Dollar and Kraay (2002) which consists of a combination of sources,
Deininger and Squire (1996), UN-WIDER (2000), Ravaillion and
Chen (2000) and Lundberg and Squire (2000), IEP (2010). Additional
waves are from UN-WIDER (2010)
GDP This is the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita. It also appears
in the body of the text as ‘‘average per capita income’’
Dollar and Kraay (2002) sample and the World Bank, World
Development Indicators (2010)
Openness Exports and Imports added together as a ratio of GDP Dollar and Kraay (2002) and The World Bank, World Development
Indicators (2010)
Government share Government Consumption as a ratio of GDP Dollar and Kraay (2002) and The World Bank, World Development
Indicators (2010)
Inflation Calculated as one plus the inflation rate, and then the natural
logarithm of this number is taken
Dollar and Kraay (2002) and The World Bank, World Development
Indicators (2010)
Rule of law An index composed to assign values for the quality of rule of law.
Higher numbers indicate a stronger rule of law
Dollar and Kraay (2002) and the The World Bank WGI database
(2010)
Commercial bank assets Calculated as Commercial Bank Assets as a ratio of Total Bank
Assets
Dollar and Kraay (2002) and the World Bank, World Development
Indicators (2010) and the Financial Structure Database (2010)
Private credit Calculated as Private Credit as a ratio of GDP, and measures the
depth of the financial system, for example the financial resources
provided to the private sector
The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010) and the
Financial Structure Database (2010)
Liquid liabilities This is calculated as a ratio of GDP and measureasn the size of the
financial intermediaries
The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010) and the
Financial Structure Database (2010)
Stock market Calculated as the Stock Market Capitalisation as a ratio of GDP The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010) and the
Financial Structure Database (2010)
Table B
Descriptive statistics of the main variables.
Variable name Obs Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Income of the poor 568 6.830 1.283 3.369 10.07
GDP 568 8.033 1.164 4.740 10.76
Trade openness 495 0.474 0.413 0.017 03.075
Government share 522 0.143 0.054 0.011 0.400
Inflation 544 0.165 0.324 0.073 2.636
Rule of law 508 0.242 0.937 1.844 2.000
Commercial bank 495 0.795 0.188 0.126 1.000
Private credit 495 0.363 0.299 0.014 1.803
Liquid liabilities 458 0.782 5.759 0.015 121.7⁄
Stock market 233 0.345 0.447 0.000 2.659
Omitting this outlier does not change the results significantly.
Note the descriptive statistics are for the updated sample only.
Descriptive Statistics for the original dataset are available upon request.
⁄ Denotes the outlier Venezuela 1962.
22 This debate has also been opened in light of the financial crisis where loan officers
of the ‘‘big-banks’’ were predicted to not have screened their clients adequately.
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4. Conclusion
Adding new waves of data to the existing research undertaken
by Dollar and Kraay, I complement their findings that average in-
comes of the poorest quintile in a country rise and fall proportion-
ally with average incomes. The addition of pro-growth policies in
my estimations are also robust to the scrutiny of new additional
data. It may be stated that governments that seek low levels of
inflation, pursue open trade regimes, strengthen their legal sys-
tems and curb their government spending will create good plat-
forms for average income growth. As income growth for the
poorest fifth in society grows proportionally with average income
growth, the results suggest to alleviate poverty by raising the per
capita incomes of the poorest quintile; basic growth-enhancing
policies still have a role to play.
Specifically focusing on finance and using further measures of
financial development, I find financial development may alleviate
poverty, but not universally. It is imperative to realise a ‘‘one size
fits all’’ model does not work as different regions react differently
to financial development when we consider income growth of
the poorest quintile. The extreme variation can be specifically seen
comparing South Asia, where financial development is successful
in raising the income of the poorest quintile, with the region of La-
tin America & the Caribbean, where evidence suggests the
contrary.
Governments may be required to intervene to promote financial
provision for the poor, for at least the short term. Examples of
schemes to increase outreach in the short run may be to use the al-
ready existent postal network to provide finance by extending the
post office’s services. Here, high fixed and sunk costs have already
been spent, so financial transactions may be provided at marginal
cost. This should overcome the difficulties of providing for low in-
come clients who only require small transactions until the private
sector is ready to cater for them. This may occur once technological
innovation has advanced to make it profitable to do so, or when al-
ready existent revenue streams have dried up serving high net
worth customers.
I highlight that the poor profit as much as everyone else to over-
all per capita growth universally, but, with respect to financial
development, this is not the case and certain regions respond bet-
ter than others.
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